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ABSTRACT 
 Throughout the past 70 years, the alliance between the United States and Republic 
of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has persisted in a dynamic security environment in 
which South Korea emerged as a middle-power with robust crisis management 
capabilities. Conversely, the 1995 famine in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK or North Korea) showcased the DPRK’s inability to provide basic services; it was 
the first time the regime solicited international humanitarian assistance, thus allowing 
international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to operate in the country. 
Social network analysis helps illuminate how the pedantic political relationship between 
the two Koreas caused fluctuations within the humanitarian assistance networks to the 
DPRK. Due to the ROK’s humanitarian assistance capabilities and the strength of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance, the United States is less likely to conduct unilateral humanitarian 
assistance operations. Although many capable nongovernmental organizations exist on 
the Korean Peninsula, the ever-changing geopolitical situation between the United States, 
ROK, and DPRK can restrict their ability to execute humanitarian operations there. 
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From one of the most ethnically homogenous groups of people in the world, two 
very different Koreas have emerged over the past 65 years.1 Although external factors 
affected the state of affairs for North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, their pursuit of radically different 
types of government have resulted in extremely divergent civil societies and economies. 
For South Korea, the 1980s democracy movement coincided with the global expansion of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO). During this time, NGOs gained government 
funding and became key implementers of aid across the region.2 As the newly democratic 
ROK developed its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) capacity through 
NGOs, North Korea’s totalitarianism has resulted in periodic humanitarian catastrophes.3  
North Korea, which in the 1950s and ’60s was the relatively more economically 
successful and politically stable country on the peninsula, now lags far behind South Korea 
on all development indices.4 While the political development of South Korea was 
historically more turbulent than that of North Korea, the end result in the South has been a 
wealthy, democratic society.5 As South Korea rose to global prominence, North Korea’s 
regime pursued a nuclear weapons program as a means to ensure its survival.6 The quality 
of life for the average North Korean citizens, which pales in comparison to the quality of 
life of the average South Korean citizen, especially in terms of health care and food 
security, deteriorates further in a natural disaster or crisis. 
                                                 
1 Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: HarperCollins, 2013). 
2 Korea Economic Institute of America, “Expected Role of South Korea and Major Stakeholders: 
NGO Contributions to and Roles in North Korea’s Rehabilitation,” accessed July 24, 2018, 
http://www.keia.org/publication/expected-role-south-korea-and-major-stakeholders-ngo-contributions-and-
roles-north-korea.  
3 Korea Economic Institute of America, “Expected Role of South Korea.”  
4 Cha, The Impossible State. 
5 Scott Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).  
6 Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads.  
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When Kim Jong-un took power in the DPRK in 2012, the increase in aggressive 
actions toward regional allies of the United States, and the deteriorating humanitarian 
conditions for the North Korean average citizen led to an increase in international pressure 
to mitigate the menace the country presented to its own citizens and neighboring 
countries.7 International pressure on the Kim Regime remains central to these efforts. Acts 
of aggression, such as testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017, have 
resulted in the toughening of international sanctions.8 However, attempts to limit the 
regime’s ability to proliferate nuclear weapons through sanctions have also hindered its 
ability to provide basic services, such as food and medical care to the DPRK’s 25 million 
citizens.9 That being said, sanctions are only partly responsible for the deteriorating 
conditions within the country. The strategic choice by the DPRK to focus on weapons 
development in lieu of medicine and food is also responsible for the poor humanitarian 
conditions in the country.10  
North Korea did not allow the international community into the country until it was 
in dire need of assistance in the 1990s.11 The famine of the 1990s, dubbed by the Kim 
Jung-il regime as the “Arduous March” due to its severity, prompted the DPRK to initially 
request aid from the United Nations (UN) in 1995. This crisis opened the DPRK’s door to 
humanitarian organizations from the international community, including South Korea and 
the United States.12 Now for over two decades, varying levels of humanitarian operations 
have been conducted in North Korea by a variety of both NGOs and international 
organizations (IO). As current geopolitical relations appear to become more collaborative, 
the potential for civic organizations, such as NGOs, to operate in the DPRK may increase. 
                                                 
7 Eleanor Albert, “What to Know about the Sanctions on North Korea” Council on Foreign Relations, 
January 3, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea.  
8 Albert, “What to Know about the Sanctions.”  
9 Tara O, The Collapse of North Korea: Challenges, Planning and Geopolitics of Unification (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).  
10 O, The Collapse of North Korea.  
11 L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North 
Korea (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003).  
12 Flake and Snyder, Paved with Good Intentions.  
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According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the ROK 
constitutionally claims sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula and its citizens. 
Humanitarian operations in North Korea by South Korea and the United States are 
conducted with the consent of both the North Korean and South Korean governments.13 
While South Korea has the lead role in any humanitarian response on the peninsula, the 
international community through the UN, as well as the U.S. military, plays a key role in 
supporting and implementing HADR.14 
Adequately responding to crises requires international and interagency cooperation. 
The international alliance and the military relationships between the ROK and its 
international partners are divided into the United Nations Command (UNC), the Combined 
Forces Command, and the United States Forces Korea Command. Each component has a 
different responsibility in a crisis. These commands are integrated into the greater crisis 
response plan by the government of South Korea. Their specific responsibilities are 
discussed in Chapter V.  
The IOM research discusses how, in crisis management planning, NGOs are a 
critical part of policy as well as humanitarianism for the government of South Korea.15 
From the ROK’s perspective, NGO activities are an important component to stabilizing 
and unifying of the Korean Peninsula.16 The ROK government maintains tight control on 
IOs and NGOs based in South Korea and operating in North Korea. From a U.S. policy 
perspective, aid through any organization is tied to measurable outcomes in 
denuclearization by North Korea.17  
                                                 
13 International Organization of Migration, Overview of the Republic of Korea’s Emergency and 
Humanitarian Assistance System (Geneva: International Organization of Migration, 2017).   
14 International Organization of Migration, Overview.  
15 International Organization of Migration. 
16 International Organization of Migration. 
17 Leslie Young, “What Happens to North Korea’s Aid Money,” Global News, October 11, 2017, 
https://globalnews.ca/news/3797235/north-korea-aid-money/.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the available and required HADR capabilities and capacities of IO and 
NGO networks that can provide direct assistance to address a humanitarian crisis in the 
DPRK in support of U.S. government (USG) objectives on the Korean Peninsula? 
1. Deterrence and Strategic Options 
The United States and its allies have attempted to prevent another armed conflict 
between the Koreas through deterrence. Although this has succeeded in averting repetition 
of armed conflict, it has failed to prevent the DPRK from developing nuclear weapons. 
DPRK proliferation, in conjunction with changing relationships and power dynamics 
between it and the United States, ROK, and China, has created an unsettled security 
atmosphere.18 
The United States lacks a good strategic option for improving the security of the 
Korean Peninsula. Efforts, including sanctions placed on the DPRK, have failed to stop it 
from developing and testing nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. The DPRK 
appears to be extremely resilient to the increasingly stringent sanctions, but it remains 
unclear to what level the country can be economically stressed without falling into crisis.19 
A crisis on the Korean Peninsula would exacerbate an already critical humanitarian 
situation for the people of North Korea. Currently, they suffer from malnutrition and 
chronic medical conditions, which has necessitated ongoing humanitarian assistance (HA) 
by the international community since the 1990s.20 Despite the challenges, NGOs have been 
instrumental in relieving human suffering in the DPRK for over 20 years. In the absence 
of strategic certainty about the DPRK’s future, building a comprehensive understanding 
the important role of NGOs on the Korean Peninsula aids in emergency planning. 
                                                 
18 Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms 
Control Association, last modified November 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.  
19 Sang-hun Choe, “Sanctions Are Hurting North Korea. Can They Make Kim Give In?” New York 
Times, April 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/20/world/asia/north-korea-trump-sanctions-kim-
jong-un.html. 
20 World Food Programme, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” accessed November 8, 2018, 
http://www1.wfp.org/countries/democratic-peoples-republic-korea. 
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A nuclear-armed North Korea threatens not only the United States, but also U.S. 
allies in East Asia. As Paul Huth argues, “Following the end of the Korean War, the United 
States established an alliance and military presence in South Korea in support of a policy 
of extended-general deterrence against the threat of another invasion by North Korea.”21 
Addressing the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program includes four strategic options: 
prevention, turning the screws, decapitation, and acceptance.22 Mark Bowden argues that 
all possible alternatives other than acceptance involve some type of military action. Options 
range from complete destruction of the weapons arsenal, leadership, and military to 
strategic options of removing leadership or forcing the administration to abandon its 
nuclear missile program.23 Unfortunately, even with extended-general deterrence, North 
Korea is nuclear armed, and it continues to strengthen its nuclear capacity by producing 
ICBMs in addition to expanding its arsenal of short- and mid-range missiles.  
The average North Korean citizen has paid a high price for the weapons program. 
The efforts by many in the international community to curb weapons development have 
contributed to increased food insecurity and limited access to medical care. To apply 
increased pressure on the regime, the UN has imposed some of the most historically 
stringent sanctions on North Korea, and those sanctions appear to be affecting the regime’s 
strategic decisions. Since 2006, these economic sanctions increased commercial 
constraints, which now include prohibiting imports or exports that can be associated with 
the production of nuclear or missile technology. Historically, the international community 
lifts and reapplies these types of sanctions based on the extent to which North Korea 
complies with international regulations on nuclear testing.24  
Although Kim Jung-un recently engaged in denuclearization discussions mostly 
with President Moon and made an initial commitment to eliminating its weapons program, 
                                                 
21 Paul Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 25–48.  
22 Mark Bowden, “How to Deal with North Korea: There Are No Good Options. But Some Are 
Worse than Others,” The Atlantic, July–August 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-worst-problem-on-earth/528717/.  
23 Bowden, “How to Deal with North Korea.”  
24 Albert, “What to Know about the Sanctions.”  
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sanctions remain in place to ensure complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization 
(CVID).25 Since the United States and its allies are unwilling to accept a nuclear-armed 
North Korea, some level of intervention may be inevitable if the terms of denuclearization 
cannot be achieved through current tactics, such as sanctions.  
Sanctions exacerbate North Korea’s fragile state structures and force it toward 
either a decision point or collapse. According to Robert Collins’s “seven phases of 
collapse,” North Korea appears to be half way through the seven phases. The famine in the 
1990s fundamentally altered North Korea.26 Firsthand reports by defectors and refugees 
state that the disaster increased the population’s exposure to outside information and gave 
rise to an informal economy through black markets. This phenomenon pushed the country 
through Collins’s Phase 3 (increase in corruption and rise of black markets) to Phase 4 
(suppression).27 Kim Jong-un’s need to assert complete control of the country was obvious 
when he replaced over 50 percent of his senior military officials and advisors shortly after 
taking power.28 If North Korea progresses through the final phases, the international 
community will have to address all the subpar state structures including a prison system 
with an estimated 200,000 prisoners.29 
One frequent component of protracted conflicts is the indifference to international 
humanitarian law (IHL), and North Korea is no exception.30 Adequately reacting to the 
                                                 
25 Kylie Atwood, “Mike Pompeo Floats Prospect of Officially Ending Korean War Ahead of Trump-
Kim Summit,” CBS News, September 28, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korea-pompeo-
denuclearization-donald-trump-korean-war-kim-jong-un/. 
26 Robert Collins is a retired Army master sergeant and a civilian area expert in South Korea. He 
outlined the seven phases of collapse to explain how the disintegration of North Korea could potentially be 
a drawn-out process over years instead of an instantaneous event. Phase 1 is resource depletion; Phase 2 
resource depletion results in failure to maintain infrastructure; Phase 3 is the creation of independent 
organizations that circumvent the government; Phase 4 is the government’s attempt to suppress the 
independent organizations; Phase 5 is resistance against the government; Phase 6 is the breakup of the 
regime; Phase 7 is the creation of new leadership. Robert D. Kaplan, “When North Korea Falls,” The 
Atlantic, October 2006, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/when-north-korea-
falls/305228/. 
27 Kaplan, “When North Korea Falls.  
28 Kaplan.   
29 O, The Collapse of North Korea. 
30 “Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Action,” International Committee of the Red Cross, 
September 6, 2016, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/protracted-conflict-and-humanitarian-action. 
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disregard of IHL is important because failure to properly do so can result in strategic 
consequences, such as the catastrophic loss of life that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 and the 
Balkans in 1995. According to Daniel Tudor and James Pearson, the DPRK’s political 
prison camps, known as gwallisos, are renowned for their brutality and the practice of 
punishing up to three generations of the accused’s family, and as Victor Cha notes, the 
DPRK’s political system “denies its citizens every political, civil, and religious liberty.”31  
Currently, the government of North Korea provides some services only to a select 
portion of the country. North Koreans suffer from multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-
TB), malaria, and malnutrition, all of which leads to poor brain development and stunting 
among other chronic health issues.32 In 2006, it was estimated that the North Korean 
regime spent only one dollar per person for health care. Hospitals lacked basic supplies and 
clean, running water.33 A UN report titled State of Food Security and Nutrition in the 
World (SOFI), states that 10.3 million people out of the total population of 24.8 million 
were undernourished in 2017.34 Average North Koreans are estimated to be three to eight 
centimeters shorter than their South Korean counterparts due to years of undernourishment 
and malnutrition.35 Droughts in 2017 and 2018 reduced an already insubstantial annual 
food production and prompted additional requests for food aid by North Korea. Thus, a 
quick international response, when space arises to do so, is critical to prevent loss of life 
and alleviate human suffering. 
2. U.S. Department of Defense and the Republic of Korea 
A central goal of the Trump administration and the new President of South Korea, 
Moon Jae-in, is the CVID of North Korea. The diplomatic state of affairs between the 
                                                 
31 Cha, The Impossible State, 163.   
32 “DPR Korea Needs and Priorities March 2018,” ReliefWeb, April 11, 2018, 
https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/dpr-korea-needs-and-priorities-march-2018.  
33 Cha, The Impossible State. 
34 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, State of Food Security and Nutrition in 
the World (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2017), 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-I7695e.pdf. 
35 “Nine Charts Which Tell You All You Need to Know about North Korea,” BBC News, September 
26, 2017, sec. Asia, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41228181. 
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United States, the DPRK, and the ROK has shifted from hostile to cooperative in the two 
years since the 2016 U.S. elections. At this time, many efforts are underway to not only 
achieve CVID but to officially end the Korean War.36 The Department of Defense’s (DoD) 
Civil Affairs may be utilized to coordinate NGO HADR activities if there is a significant 
political change on the peninsula. DoD Directive 2000.13 obligates the DoD to maintain a 
capability to conduct multiple types of civil affairs operations (CAO) necessary to support 
DoD missions.37 This includes coordination of military activities with other USG 
departments and agencies, supporting stability operations, and consideration of the civil 
populace throughout the range of military operations. The type of instrument of national 
power utilized depends where conflict lies on the peace to war continuum (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Notional Operations across the Conflict Continuum38 
 
  
                                                 
36 Atwood, “Mike Pompeo Floats Prospect.”  
37 U.S. Department of Defense, Civil Affairs, DOD Directive 2000.13 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2014), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d2000_13.pdf.  
38 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington DC: 
Department of Defense, 2018), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_57.pdf. 
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Given that all instruments of national power have a role somewhere on this 
continuum and because civil affairs activities occur in numerous environments, civil affairs 
forces can and will have a significant role to play in a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In 
FM 3-57, dated May 2018, CAO fall into three basic categories: civil affairs activities, 
military government operations, and civil affairs supported activities.39 Figure 2 represents 
the functions nested under these three civil affairs competencies. 
Figure 2. Civil Affairs Operations40  
 
Because South Korea is a sovereign nation with the fifteenth largest economy in 
the world capable of conducting its own HADR, the United States would likely leverage 
its resources in support of ROK critical event response. Supporting foreign humanitarian 
assistance (FHA) operations, coordinating for FHA, supporting civil administration, and 
synchronizing civil-military effects are some of the primary tasks that need to be executed 
                                                 
39 U.S. Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations, Field Manual 3-57 (Washington DC: U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2018), https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/FM.aspx. 
40 Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations.  
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to support the joint force commander’s efforts. Furthermore, civil affairs companies are 
proficient in conducting targeted HA, integrating united action partner support, and 
performing transition operations to meet the joint force commander’s intent for 
stabilization of the operational environment. By leveraging the resources and expertise of 
NGOs with experience on the peninsula, the United States, and South Korea could 
effectively address key issues that might arise in an event altering the status quo.  
3. Nongovernmental Organizations 
Estimates put the death toll for the 1990s famine between 450,000 and three 
million. The famine led to the collapse of some of the basic government systems, such as 
the public distribution system (PDS) and healthcare within the country.41 One “benefit” of 
the crisis was that it opened the door to more NGO and international humanitarian 
operations within the country, which were critical to alleviate suffering. Barbara Demick 
notes how, in the absence of aid, the first to die from starvation were the average North 
Korean citizens who clung to strict societal rules and would not break the laws to acquire 
food illegally.42 
In general, humanitarian organizations were initially unprepared for the challenges 
of humanitarian operations in North Korea. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder describe NGO 
operations in North Korea from the initial aid request in 1995 through 2001 and the 
beginning of the “Sunshine Policy,” as discussed later in Chapter III of this thesis. They 
note that a primary issue for humanitarian organizations in North Korea was accounting 
for the recipients of aid because of tight regulations and oversight by North Korean 
officials.43 On a similar note, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland lay out the dilemmas 
of HA that arose for the international donor community from 1995 to 2006.44 In general, 
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humanitarian aid allowed the DPRK to increase its funding for its weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) program.  
Although the operational conditions for outside organizations have changed over 
time, the North Korean regime still tightly regulates and controls NGOs that operate inside 
its borders. Depending upon the type of situation that develops in North Korea, regime 
interference and control and other types of manipulation of the North Korean people may 
create a unique operational environment that constrains HA to those in need. The South 
Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) has sought to ensure that NGOs are better prepared 
to conduct operations in North Korea than in the past. However, limiting the North Korean 
regime’s control of HADR continues to be challenging.45 
The literature suggests that while some things in North Korea appear to be constant, 
others are changing. A new generation of North Koreans has grown up post-1990s famine. 
For example, Jieun Baek depicts a country that is rapidly changing due to the marketization 
that resulted from the 1990s famine.46 Changes include the opening of private markets as 
well as the information revolution carried into the country on SD cards and computer 
thumb drives. The implications of these changes for the regime and HA are yet to be seen, 
but recent multilateral actions indicate that South Korean aid channels may be opened to 
North Korea again.47 
Currently, experts estimate there are at least 15 foreign NGOs operating inside of 
the country. This number rises and falls based on the conditions inside the country and the 
political climate between the DPRK and other countries, specifically the United States and 
the ROK. It is thought that at least 215 NGOs have operated inside the DPRK over the past 
23 years.48 NGOs provide health services, education, humanitarian relief, development, 
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and informal diplomacy—albeit with varying degrees of autonomy and success. Some 
NGOs operate covertly in and around North Korea to provide underground support to 
defectors and regular citizens. This assistance includes human smuggling, money transfers, 
and phone calls from outside North Korea.49 This said, the majority of NGO assistance 
targets food insecurity, health care, and sanitation.50 The base of operations for most NGO 
activity on the peninsula is in South Korea and the United States. 
Recent reports indicate continued sanctions on the DPRK impact its economy and 
food security. It is plausible that some type of humanitarian crisis of the same or greater 
magnitude of the 1990s famine is possible on the peninsula, but the effects could be more 
significant due to the weakened state of the regime.51 The Cooperative for Assistance and 
Relief Everywhere (CARE) ranked the DPRK its number one under-reported humanitarian 
crisis in 2017. CARE also estimated that two in five North Koreans are malnourished.52  
Even though NGO-formed coalitions and associations are focused on many 
problem sets (not just food insecurity) on the Korean Peninsula, there is not a 
comprehensive assessment and analysis of all the capabilities and services offered by 
NGOs in and around North Korea. Although capabilities of NGOs operating on the 
peninsula could be leveraged in a humanitarian emergency event, unfortunately, there 
appear to be gaps in these critical capabilities needed to address social vulnerabilities on a 
grand scale. Thus in the future, it is important also to assess and analyze the essential 
humanitarian services that are not currently carried out by NGOs. 
Based on what is known about the full range of possible events on the Korean 
Peninsula that could increase NGO activity in North Korea, this thesis’s contribution is to 
identify and map the networks of NGO and IO operations and assess the scope and scale 
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of those operations. This is to assist the United States and South Korea to efficiently utilize 
their resources to quickly alleviate human suffering in the DPRK.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
We identify NGOs that operate on the Korean Peninsula through open-source 
media and research. The UN cluster approach organizes HA capabilities into 11 categories 
(see Figure 3).53 These deconflict responsibility for HA response and provide a structure 
for organizational responsibility in an emergency. As such, this thesis uses this model to 
categorize and classify the NGOs on the peninsula to assess their capability and determine 
relational ties between these organizations for humanitarian emergency response.  
Figure 3. The UN Cluster Approach54  
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Specifically, this thesis analyzes networks that exist between NGOs (often through 
IO implementation) that operate on the Korean Peninsula. We evaluate NGO activities on 
the peninsula organized by the UN cluster approach and plotted through social network 
analysis (SNA) to gain a clearer understanding of what resources already exist and how 
they are organized and leveraged. Analysis of HA operations with the program enables the 
team to construct visual representatives of networks and NGO activity over time.  
Research and Methodology Limitations 
The language barrier between English and Hangul (the Korean language) limits the 
information available for research. Although we used available reference material in 
English, and we consulted Korean speakers on source material in Hangul, the inability to 
conduct research in Hangul excluded access to some information. We used English-
language secondary sources when primary sources in Hangul or English were unavailable. 
There are over 300 NGOs registered with the MOU in South Korea. This thesis 
does not analyze NGO operations by South Korean NGOs in other regions of the world. 
Rather, its focus is on the role of NGOs included in the HA and crisis response plans of the 
government of South Korea for operations on the Korean Peninsula. To be concise, it was 
necessary to limit the scope by focusing on only active organizations and organizations 
that are short-listed by the MOU for crisis response in the DPRK.  
Humanitarian operations and activities in the DPRK are the most secretive of any 
country in the world. We made some inferences based on external evidence about the 
existence and capability of some organizations because we lacked the ability to 
independently verify their operations. The testimony of defectors and self-reporting by 
NGOs of what activities are conducted in North Korea are two types of sources from which 
we made inferences. Long-standing humanitarian organizations, such as the Eugene Bell 
Foundation, and respected media outlets, such as NK News, form the backbone of 
inferences and predictions about humanitarian operations in North Korea.  
This thesis’s classification level is unclassified. However, the complete details of 
ROK crisis management plans are confidential and have not been released to the public. 
The military operational plans of both the United States and ROK are classified. We 
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derived the most accurate account of crisis response possible with the available open source 
information. Our recommendation is for a secondary effort to further develop this thesis 
through the use confidential and classified source documentation. 
C. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I has introduced the conditions in which NGOs can operate in the DPRK 
and the complexity of humanitarian operations in the closed society. It has also described 
strategic options in limiting the DPRK’s WMD program and how some options impact 
humanitarian operations and civilian living conditions in the country. 
Chapter II lays out how the donor-recipient relationship developed on the Korean 
Peninsula. It highlights the changes that took place after the fall of the Soviet Union and 
how those changes created an aid-dependent DPRK. Chapter II also describes the reasons 
for the development of a robust HADR capability in South Korea.  
Chapter III outlines the historical involvement of NGOs in North Korea. It expands 
on greater regional dynamics over the past 23 years that impact aid to a greater level than 
just need alone. This chapter lays the foundation for Chapter IV by providing context for 
the changes in NGO operations and the different levels of funding to NGOs over the years. 
Chapter IV draws on SNA to analyze the NGO network over time. This approach 
assists with understanding the qualities of NGOs that make them the most persistent and 
resilient organizations conducting operations in a constrained environment. The chapter 
also demonstrates how the wider geopolitics of U.S.-ROK-DPRK relations affect HADR 
in North Korea. 
Chapter V offers conclusions based on the thesis’s analysis, as well as 
recommendations for U.S.-ROK HADR capacity building and utilization. Finally, it also 
describes the current conditions for HADR in North Korea and makes recommendations 
for U.S. forces in crisis response planning for NGOs on the Korean Peninsula.  
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II. EVOLUTION OF HADR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
This chapter lays out some of the distinct historical conditions and events that 
shaped the development of HADR NGOs in South Korea. The North Korean government 
has prevented the growth of independent organizations, and so North Korean citizens have 
been completely reliant on government institutions that weakened after the end of the Cold 
War, a situation that ultimately has resulted in a series of crises. Economic success and 
repeated crisis events on the Korean Peninsula have motivated the ROK government and 
humanitarian organizations to foster crisis response capacity to respond to humanitarian 
crisis in North Korea partly for the purpose of unification.55 This chapter outlines the 
development of NGOs in South Korea and the participation of the South Korean 
government in NGO HADR capacity-building. It also discusses how HA to North Korea 
is both apolitical and political. 
For purposes of general discussion, we use the terms “crisis” and “disaster” 
interchangeably.56 While there are some subtle differences between the use of “disaster” 
and “crisis” in the literature, there is no single definition of catastrophic events. Here, we 
refer to catastrophic events or events that exceed the ability of people to maintain daily life 
operations and cause significant harm, as both “crisis” and “disaster” with no distinction 
between the two.57 We also use the terms “aid” and “assistance” interchangeably because 
different organizations refer to the same type of humanitarian support in North Korea by 
both terms. 
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A. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND 
HADR 
There is a relationship between poor governance, economics, and humanitarian 
need.58 External assistance is usually leveraged to save lives and promote stability for 
countries lacking internal crisis response capacity.59 Economic conditions and politics in 
the DPRK and the ROK impact the degree of vulnerability from disaster and the crisis 
response capacity by each country. On the Korean Peninsula, South Korea can leverage 
resources that North Korea cannot leverage. This is unfortunate since potential disasters 
range from extreme seasonal weather patterns, such as typhoons and earthquakes, to all-
out war.60  
North Korea’s 1990s famine was a pivotal moment for disaster response on the 
peninsula. It claimed an estimated three million North Korean lives.61 The extent of the 
crisis shocked the international community, including the responding NGOs.62 Flake and 
Snyder identified how North Korea’s appeal for HA was the first opportunity for 
organizations such as NGOs and international humanitarian aid organizations to gain 
access to the closed society.63 More symbolically, North Korea became the recipient of aid 
from its greatest rival, South Korea.64 
The reversal of economic fortunes of the Koreas impacted the population’s access 
to resources and its resiliency in crisis since financial health of a country is a critical 
component to HADR. An economically strong South Korea and economically weak North 
Korea was not an obvious outcome in the decades shortly after the end of the Korean War. 
As described by Victor Cha in his book The Impossible State, at the end of WWII, North 
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Korea had a more advanced industrial capacity due to rich natural resources imperial Japan 
developed during the colonial era.65 Whereas South Korea was an agricultural center, 
North Korea was an industrial hub, containing 80 percent of the heavy industrial capacity 
on the peninsula in 1945.66 Even though much of this capacity was destroyed in the 1950–
1953 Korean War, China and the Soviet Union quickly aided the DPRK in rebuilding.67 
Cha goes on to discuss that by many standards, North Korea was the more advanced 
country on the peninsula for approximately 30 years. During the 1960s and 1970s, it 
enjoyed relative economic success while the South Korean economy sputtered in spite of 
the fact that it received robust foreign aid, principally from the United States.68 Continued 
foreign assistance, such as economic aid and trade pacts with Cold War allies, were 
fundamental to the North Korean economic strength and the development of its industries, 
infrastructure, and agriculture.69  
There are several factors why the North Korean economy began its downward turn 
from the late 1980s through the 1990s. The most significant factor was the end of aid it 
received from the Soviet Union and China.70 From the end of the Cold War in the 1980s, 
the North Korean economy stagnated while the South Korean economy began a distinct 
upward trajectory as the country democratized.71 The economic reversal of fortunes 
eclipsed previous predictions and expert analysis on North and South Korea. According to 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 2015 the per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) for North Korea was $1,700. In the same year, South 
Korea had a per capita GDP of $37,000.72 South Korea currently boasts the fifteenth largest 
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economy in the world.73 The economic gap between the two countries continues to 
tangibly impact the day-to-day circumstances of North Korea citizens as well as North 
Korea’s ability to prevent and respond to crisis events. 
The results of the two economic paths and governmental spending priorities is most 
apparent in the areas of food security and health care. Over the past 30 years, South Korea 
has advanced in providing universal health care coverage, and the country has one of the 
longest life expectancies in the world, while North Koreans suffer from MDR-TB, malaria, 
and malnutrition, which leads to poor brain development and stunting among other chronic 
health issues.74 In 2006, it is estimated that the North Korean regime spent only one dollar 
per person for health care. Hospitals lacked basic supplies and clean, running water.75 The 
2015 SOFI report stated that 10.3 million people out of the total population of 24.8 million 
were undernourished in 2017.76 By these measures, the people in the DPRK live in a 
perpetual low-level humanitarian crisis situation. 
B. DEVELOPMENT AND REPRESSION OF THE INDEPENDENT 
SOCIETY 
The inequality in crisis management and disaster response capacity between the 
two Koreas is in part economic, but it is also in part due to the very different conditions of 
the individual citizens in each country. NGO development requires a passionate society 
with a space to organize and the belief that social issues are the responsibility of the people, 
not just the government.77 South Korea’s independently-minded culture has been 
instrumental in shaping the country’s success, even its modern democracy. By contrast, 
North Korea’s totalitarian regime has actively discouraged independent thought and 
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activities, and this has created complete dependency upon the government, as is intended.78 
In North Korea, there is no concept of an organization that is “nongovernmental.”79 Every 
aspect of a North Korean’s personal and public life is regulated by the state.80 For North 
Korea, duties and rights are based on collectivism. Individualism is seen as a threat and a 
negative trait.81 The highly structured and controlled lives of North Koreans, as well as the 
regime’s use of fear and mutual mistrust, undermines the ability of individuals to organize 
outside of official state functions.82  
The inminban, or “people’s groups,” is a particularly effective mechanism for the 
state to surveil its citizen’s private lives in their homes and communities. The inminban 
records finite details of daily life, such as which families share common areas as well as 
their incomes and assets. It is responsible for reporting suspicious activity by any member 
in the community. Travel outside of one’s village, which is a routine pattern of life for most 
people in the world, requires a pass.83 Even beyond physical controls and monitoring, the 
required indoctrination and “mutual criticism sessions” control peoples’ time.84 The 
combination of the constant monitoring and control with the fear of internment (sometimes 
including one’s family members) in political prison camps successfully quells outright 
deviation from any prescribed behavior.85  
The former PDS was the cornerstone to the distribution of all goods but most 
importantly, food rations.86 Laws prohibiting the private sale of grains, and the relative 
unavailability outside of the rationing system of most goods, cemented complete control 
of the population by the state. When the PDS ceased to function during the famine of the 
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1990s, North Korean citizens forced to survive without government support did so through 
activities such as the creation of private market exchanges. Although these are now a 
common part of the society, they are not publicly acknowledged activities since, 
technically, they are illegal.87 
In South Korea, civil society space is mostly unrestricted. South Korea grew much 
of its democracy out of coordinated grassroots political activism in the “June Democracy 
Movement in 1987.”88 As democratic ideals took root, so did domestic civic organizations 
such as NGOs.89 This eventually led to their incorporation into the South Korean 
governmental institutional organization.90 
The famine in the 1990s in North Korea was a catalyst for the expansion of HADR 
organizations in South Korea. South Korean religious organizations shaped government 
policy through their robust HADR response to starvation in the DPRK.91 This increased 
capability in disaster assistance led to increased funding for NGOs by the South Korean 
government and greater South Korean participation in international HA.92 The increased 
capacity of South Korean NGOs and networks of experts, donors, and other IO support HA 
has been a critical component of peaceful reunification.93 
C. NGOS AND THE ROK GOVERNMENT 
Aid to North Korea by the South Korean government is constrained by both the 
regional security environment and domestic politics.94 NGOs can operate when 
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intergovernmental conflict prevents direct country-to-country aid, and South Korean 
NGOs can facilitate inter-Korean reconciliation in a manner that ROK to DPRK 
governmental interaction cannot.95 Thus, NGOs play an important role in inter-Korean 
relations and efforts toward unification. They are also a critical component of the 
government of South Korea’s HADR planning and disaster response.96 
Articles 3 and 4 of the South Korean Constitution assert that the entire Korean 
Peninsula is its legitimate territory. As such, the South Korean government sees the people 
living in North Korea as citizens to whom it is responsible to extend protection and 
assistance.97 For many South Koreans, assistance to the people living in the DPRK is a 
legal obligation, but more importantly, it is viewed as a moral imperative to extend 
democracy and freedom to the entire peninsula.98 
Operations by domestic South Korean NGOs are divided into two categories: North 
Korean or other. Although some organizations conduct both North Korean-focused 
activities and non-North Korean activities, there is a defined internal organizational 
separation between the two distinct operational foci. The division of operational focus 
typically includes separate allocations of personnel and resources.99 
During the 1990s famine in North Korea, NGO aid and HA uncontrolled by the 
ROK impacted the ROK’s government’s ability to use aid as a political tool.100 According 
to Flake and Snyder, the ROK’s attempt to control North-South activity and prevent HA 
through a “single-channel” policy resulted in conflict between it and the NGOs.101 The 
strongly-held belief by many South Koreans that NGOs should be able to provide aid 
culminated in the 1996 Peace Conference where there was a mass call for a multichannel 
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policy to aid the DPRK.102 Organizations solicited increased support for North Korea and 
formed the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) to provide aid for the purpose of 
reconciliation.103 By 1997, the multichannel policy allowed for individual NGOs to 
operate in North Korea.104  
Flake and Snyder explain how South Korea’s Sunshine Policy was an attempt by 
President Kim Dae-jung to improve the inter-Korean relations. From 1998 to 2007, ROK 
NGOs were able to expand efforts from aid to capacity building.105 NGOs assisted in 
furthering the government’s intent to demonstrate goodwill toward North Korea through 
assistance and cooperation.106 In 2001, the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with 
North Korea (KNCCNK) was established to improve the relationship between NGOs and 
the South Korean government.107 
Currently, South Korean NGO activities in North Korea are channeled through the 
MOU, which was established in 1969.108 All domestic and international NGOs based in 
South Korea are registered with the MOU. There are several reasons for the registration 
requirement. First, NGO capacity is considered a national-level resource that could be 
mobilized as part of the government’s North-South unification plan.109 Second, due to the 
sensitivity of North-South operations and laws regulating independent interactions with 
North Korea by South Koreans, the MOU is the important control point for all activities in 
the DPRK.110 Third, sanctions prohibit the transfer of some material and equipment into 
North Korea. Even charitable activities of NGOs require oversight and regulation to 
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prevent the unlawful transfer of contraband.111 Finally, the MOU independently vets the 
capacity and capability of NGOs and places them on a separate list of authorized response 
organizations. This ensures that each NGO has the adequate qualifications to conduct crisis 
management or HADR activity in the DPRK.112  
The ROK now has organizations with robust HADR capacity and formal structures 
in both its greater society and in the government. And yet, due to a unique historical state 
of affairs between the DPRK and the ROK, the establishment of NGOs in South Korea and 
their role in disaster relief in North Korea for over 20 years has distinctive qualities separate 
from NGO operations in other countries. The challenges of providing aid continue to shape 
organizations and approaches to assisting the people of the DPRK when crisis emerges. 
The historical operations of NGOs in North Korea, specifically South Korea NGOs, are 
explained in the following chapter.  
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III. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 
1995–2017 
The surreptitious manipulation of many humanitarian operations in North Korea 
has often obscured the humanitarian objectives of such aid. Aid to North Korea has become 
a political tool used by both the international community and the DPRK to meet their own 
objectives. Since it is an instrument of power for both the donor and recipient, the amount 
and type of aid is often determined more by the desire to achieve a particular political 
outcome than a particular need.113 Since the administration of aid originates with or 
through NGOs, their operations are nested within the context of greater aid relations with 
North Korea.  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea has relied on other 
international assistance.114 Uncontrollable environmental conditions, poor farming 
practices, extreme seasonal flooding made worse by deforestation, and lack of chemical 
fertilizers have made North Korean food self-sufficiency unrealistic, if not impossible. 
Medical services fare no better. For example, North Korea has one of the highest 
tuberculosis rates in the world.115 Early on, HA and international governmental generosity 
hinged on the belief that supporting the needs of North Koreans in the short term was 
beneficial because the regime’s collapse was believed to be imminent.116 However, nearly 
23 years since North Korea asked for assistance from the UN, it has defied analysts’ dire 
predictions, and its economy is growing at a steady pace.117 Ironically, however, its 
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economic growth is linked to the increased size of the privatized market, which the 
government does not officially acknowledge.118  
North Korea receives a disproportionate amount of aid compared to other countries 
of similar size.119 From 1995 to 2005, the international community gave it millions of 
dollars in unfettered aid in an attempt to build trust and encourage its leadership to abandon 
their nuclear weapons program.120 Over 10 million metric tons of food aid alone was sent 
to the DPRK during those 10 years.121 Yet, it is estimated that by 2005, the regime had 
diverted 30 percent of the aid to support its own agenda, including weapons development 
and its military.122 
A. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 1995–2008 
Since 1995, the presence of NGOs and financial support for humanitarian 
operations has reflected the nature of geopolitical relationships and activities more than the 
humanitarian needs inside North Korea. The North Korean government attracts aid by 
playing games with the international community.123 For example, by creating a crisis to 
escalate tensions, it has extorted payments and compromises from the international 
community in return for restoring the peaceful status quo.124 Even before the DPRK sought 
aid in 1995, it used various tactics to extract aid. For instance, since 1994, several major 
diplomatic efforts to curb aggressive rogue activity by the regime has been tied to aid.125 
The North Korean government prefers unconditional aid, and it tries to manipulate the 
international community to acquire aid packages that lack the standard oversight conditions 
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for monitoring.126 In addition, it places more stringent controls on NGOs from the United 
States and South Korea. It does not grant them residency in Pyongyang, and so they must 
rely on organizations inside North Korea, such as the World Food Program (WFP), to 
administer and monitor their aid.127 
The mid-1990s collapse of the North Korean PDS was thought to be a watershed 
moment for international community intervention into North Korea’s closed society.128 
Flake and Snyder illustrate that the PDS was the primary method through which food and 
resources were distributed to North Korean citizens.129 Although the PDS system was 
nonfunctional, the early stages of aid distribution in North Korea challenged aid workers 
because they lacked a humanitarian space to operate in. Previous experience and training 
were insufficient to understand the complexity of the crisis and the political dynamics to 
operate in such a unique humanitarian environment.130 Even so, Flake and Snyder state 
that in 1996, the UN WFP set up offices to manage the aid distribution and NGO 
operations. At that time, there were approximately 15 NGOs operating in North Korea 
although not all of them had permanent residency.131  
Furthermore, they argue that the first years of HA to the DPRK (1995–2001) set 
the conditions and tone for future NGO and governmental crisis response and HADR 
operations. Unlike governments of other countries facing similar humanitarian challenges, 
the North Korean government acquired and retained control of humanitarian operations 
inside the country. This reduced the ability of NGOs to transparently administer aid and 
abide by humanitarian norms. Additionally, it was difficult for them to assess the need and 
impact of aid accurately, monitor where assistance was going, and ensure that resources 
were utilized as donors intended.132 For example, many districts were off limits to 
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humanitarian organizations, and the DPRK insisted on unilateral assistance to the restricted 
areas.133 Later, the international community learned that this was because of the DPRK’s 
intentional effort to fund its weapons program by using humanitarian aid to augment its 
own expenditure on food and not to supplement its limited supplies.134 Ironically, 
international humanitarian aid was instrumental in funding the weapons programs the 
international donors condemned. 
Operational constraints in violation of humanitarian norms continue to affect aid to 
North Korea.135 From the outset, the North Korean government monitored and controlled 
all interactions between aid workers and North Koreans, and until 2004, the DPRK only 
permitted non-Korean speaking aid workers into the country.136 This forced NGOs to 
operate with limited information and only indirect contact with the average North 
Korean.137 It also ensured that the NGOs did not expose the average North Korean to 
external ideas or information.138 
Flake and Snyder illustrate how the DPRK prevented NGOs and other international 
organizations from monitoring food deliveries per humanitarian operational norms.139 
NGOs were unable to validate whether their resources reached the intended recipients.140 
This systematic control of humanitarian operations by the government led to two responses 
by NGOs to continued HADR operations in the DPRK. Some ceased all operations and 
withdrew from the country. According to Flake and Snyder, others continued to operate, 
believing that their efforts had the potential to bring positive change to North Korea.141  
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The dissemination of “negative information” was a constant concern for North 
Korean officials.142 Flake and Snyder illustrate how careful orchestration of the aid worker 
activities protected it from outside criticism.143 The inability to conduct accurate 
assessments and submit accurate reports created a dilemma for NGOs. An NGO reporting 
on the current humanitarian situation and conditions in North Korea risked expulsion or 
increased constraints on their humanitarian activities.144 However, the under-reporting of 
the extent of the humanitarian crisis frustrated humanitarian organizations and contributed 
to donor fatigue for North Korean causes.145 
Several other points are noted by Flake and Snyder. The insertion of ROK aid into 
North Korea was highly controlled by the South Korean government. The ROK enacted a 
single channel policy from 1995 to 1998, which meant that aid was routed through the 
ROK Red Cross to the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) for delivery into 
North Korea.146 In 1998, however, ROK NGOs began unilaterally supplying aid to the 
DPRK.147 The opening of multichannel policy increased participation by NGOs which 
could now independently set up operations with contacts in North Korea.  
Since 1997, the level of aid given to North Korea by South Korea has fluctuated 
depending upon whether the president is from the conservative or progressive party.148 
Conservative administrations take a hardline stance and favor of a policy of containment, 
whereas progressive administrations prefer a policy of engagement.149 The Sunshine 
Policy was initiated by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in 1997 and lasted through 
the presidency of his successor, Roh Moo Hyun, in 2008.150 The policy’s relatively long 
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length was due to the fact that both Presidents Kim and Roh were progressives who 
believed that the road to the normalization of relations, and perhaps even unification with 
North Korea, would occur through political and economic engagement.151 They assumed 
that engagement with North Korea would force the international community, including 
North Korea, to support greater involvement in the international market community.152 In 
2007, at the height of the Sunshine Policy, private and government sources gave North 
Korea $466,707,349 in aid.153 In 2001, South Korean NGOs accounted for almost 80 
percent of the total South Korean aid, which well exceeded that given by the international 
community.154 The original expansion of NGO efforts began with the DPRK’s request for 
aid, but NGO numbers surged with South Korea’s increased support.  
Creative approaches to humanitarian operations by NGOs and international 
organizations allowed for greater access and coordination of efforts. One example is the 
NGO consortium named InterAction. This U.S.-based association, in cooperation with 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), was instrumental in the 
initial coordination of NGO activity in North Korea.155 InterAction founded the 
InterAction North Korean Working Group as a platform for information dissemination and 
coordination for U.S. NGOs operating in North Korea.156 It assisted with the creation of 
the Food Aid Liaison Unit in Pyongyang, which represented resident and non-resident 
NGOs and facilitated communication between NGOs and Pyongyang, as well as carrying 
out monitoring and coordination.157 However, the efforts of InterAction in North Korea 
were complicated by NGOs fearing consolidated efforts assisted the DPRK in controlling 
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the aid it received.158 InterAction also assisted in forming the U.S. Private Voluntary 
Organization Consortium (PVOC), which, in part, oversaw the distribution of U.S. aid from 
1997 to 1999. At the height of its operations, the PVOC had a total membership of 10 IOs 
and NGOs.159 However, although organizations affiliated with InterAction continue to 
conduct humanitarian operations in the DPRK, very little information about their activities 
is available. 
During the early 2000s, NGO operations in the DPRK were subjected to external 
and internal operational stressors. The international community contributed a total of $2.3 
billion of assistance to North Korea from 1995 to –2005. However, by 2002, donor fatigue 
set in due to North Korea’s uncooperative humanitarian environment and the strain on the 
humanitarian community to respond to crisis events in other parts of the world, and in 2008, 
U.S. NGOs delivering aid were expelled from North Korea for unknown reasons.160  
B. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA 2009–2017 
Many factors affected HA to the DPRK in the years between 2009 and 2017. During 
this period, the United States provided very little assistance. It reduced aid to the DPRK 
when the latter withdrew from the six-party talks and continued its missile and nuclear 
weapon testing.161 At first, South Korea supplemented some of the aid, but it eventually 
reverted to a policy of containment. For many years, China has supplemented the downturn 
in U.S. and ROK aid in part to stabilize North Korea and prevent North Koreans from 
crossing the border into China.162 Aid to North Korea from the UN and NGOs fell to its 
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lowest level in 2010. This was a response to North Korea’s sinking of a South Korean naval 
ship, the Cheonan, which led to the death of 46 sailors.163  
In general, NGOs that foster their own working relationships in North Korea are 
usually able to preserve operations during times of political tension. The Eugene Bell 
Foundation, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and the Christian Friends 
of Korea (CHFK) are all examples of small religious NGOs that have built structurally-
sound working relationships in North Korea and can usually operate outside of the 
geopolitical constraints.164 
The Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (KNCCNK) is an 
umbrella organization for more than 50 NGOs based in Seoul. Founded in 1999, it has 
persisted in overseeing NGO operations and humanitarian aid to North Korea, even if those 
efforts are limited by the geopolitical situation.165 The number of participating NGOs in 
the KNCCNK has grown from 21 members in 2001 to 54 members in 2015, many of which 
are registered with the MOU.166 
Aid to North Korea is factored into South Korea’s annual budget and is reflective 
of needs and geopolitical dynamics as documented in a report by the IOM.167 Aid is 
administered through the government, ROK NGOs, or the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund 
(i.e., the Korean channel for international organizations).168 South Korea’s governments 
from 2009 through the beginning of 2017 were relatively conservative, which is why they 
embraced a policy of containment instead of engagement and funneled aid through IOs and 
NGOs in lieu of direct support.169 
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The IOM report documented how different administrations focused on different 
types of aid. The Kim Yong-sam (1993–1998), Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), Roh Moo-
huyn (2003–2008), and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) administrations focused primarily on 
vulnerable populations, while the administration of President Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) 
focused on general aid and emergency relief.170 Changes in operational focus require 
different NGO and humanitarian response capacities. The increase in support for NGO 
activity in 2017 by the Moon Jae-in administration bolstered NGO activity and capacity.171 
In 2017, there were officially 100 NGOs registered with the MOU in South Korea. The 
majority of these are faith-based and focused on inter-Korean unification and 
reconciliation.172 Chapter IV of this thesis further identifies how variation in 
administration priorities requires different NGO capabilities which are leveraged to 
achieve the South Korean government’s goals. 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Although NGO capacity has grown in the United States, Europe, and South Korea, 
only half the humanitarian organizations operating in North Korea in 2010 are still 
operating today.173 Sanctions debilitate NGO resourcing, and the underfunding of general 
aid affects the ability of organizations to conduct HA and crisis management in North 
Korea. The UN has stopped some nutritional programs due to a 90 percent funding 
shortfall.174 In the current environment of efforts, cooperation toward denuclearization and 
the economics of humanitarian aid and politics are closely linked, and NGOs find 
themselves caught in a unique operational environment. However, there is growing 
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potential for NGO operations in North Korea as the “neo-Sunshine Policy” relations 
between the ROK and DPRK continue to progress toward a peaceful resolution to a 
decades-long conflict.175  
Since 1995, North Korea has allowed at least 215 NGOs to operate in North 
Korea.176 How external and internal factors affect the number and type of NGOs operating 
at any one time can be visually depicted using SNA software. Thus, the focus of Chapter 
IV is to analyze the changes in the capabilities and size of NGO networks from 1995 to 
2018. This provides the baseline data for recommendations on NGO integration into 
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IV. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DISASTER RESPONSE 
NETWORK TO NORTH KOREA 
This chapter draws on SNA to analyze the NGO-IO network over time. SNA is “a 
collection of theories and methods that assume the behavior of actors (whether individuals, 
groups, or organizations) is profoundly affected by their ties to others and the networks in 
which they are embedded.”177 SNA not only allows analysts to record the actors and the 
ties between them, it also includes tools to allow them to quantify, test, and predict various 
social phenomena within the network.178 Put differently, as Everton explains, “SNA is 
based on the assumption that actors’ behavior is driven by how they are linked to others 
and the network in which they are embedded.”179 Moreover, as Everton also notes, “social 
networks are an important concept for understanding the needs, motivations, and capacities 
of individuals in a society.”180 In the context of our thesis, SNA can assist with gaining an 
understanding of the qualities of NGOs that make them the most persistent and resilient 
organizations conducting operations in a constrained environment. Building on the 
historical involvement of NGOs in North Korea discussed in Chapter III, this chapter 
provides analysis and visual representation of the NGO network as it changed over time in 
reaction to the broader geopolitics of U.S.-ROK-DPRK relations toward HADR in North 
Korea. Unless noted otherwise, we conducted this chapter’s SNA using the Programs 
UCINET, ORA, and PAJEK.181  
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A. NETWORK BOUNDARIES 
The data and information we used to build this dataset are exclusively constructed 
from open source materials regarding the humanitarian efforts from both ROK NGOs 
and/or IOs specifically for North Korea. The data we derived from these sources cover the 
years 1995–2018. We used 1995 as the beginning point because it is when North Korea 
reached out to the international community for HA in light of a significant natural disaster 
that was beyond the capacity of the North Korean government to address. The data for 
2018 are unfortunately (but necessarily) incomplete because as of this writing 2018 still 
has two months to go; we take this into account in our analysis below. The data and 
humanitarian information came from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs Democratic People’s Republic (UNOCHA DPR) Korea needs and 
priorities yearly documents, International IOM 2018 document on the Korean Peninsula, 
Congressional Research Service reports, Relief Web, MOU website, and the NK News 
scraping feature of multiple news sources reporting on North Korean events. In building 
the network and deciding which actors to include, we used a hybrid of both the realist and 
nominalist approaches. The realist approach is when the actors define the boundaries, 
whereas with the nominalist approach the analyst imposes the network boundaries.182 We 
used five basic criteria when deciding which NGOs and IOs to include in our network:  
1. They had to be based in South Korea. 
2. They had to be included in one of the following “lists”: 
a. Listed in the IOM document as NGOs working on humanitarian 
assistance to North Korea and officially approved by MOU.  
b. Affiliated under the KNCCNK, including the ones that were not in 
the IOM document.  
c. IOs with residence in North Korea, to include the European Union 
Project Support units. 
d. Any additional IOs listed on the UNOCHA DPR Korea needs and 
priorities yearly documents as other nonresident agencies. 
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Although plenty of sources were collated on the general topic of larger NGOs and 
other IOs operating within North Korea, credible or existing sources that revealed specific 
NGOs, their capacity, and area of operation was severely limited, thus stifling our ability 
to provide comprehensive information on the topic. A total of 108 NGOs/IOs are included 
in the network. See Appendix 1 for a complete listing of all 108 NGOs/IOs. 
1. Network Ties (Relations) 
We created a two-mode network titled Years Active consisting of 108 NGOs and 
IOs by the years (1995 to 2018) in which they provided HA to North Korea, whether the 
assistance was ongoing or in response to a natural disaster. Data for IOs were more readily 
available through open-source sites than they were for ROK NGOs. We used the MOU 
registration date as the year the ROK NGOs became active in the network. If the date was 
unavailable, then we used the date provided on the NGO’s website or from open-source 
documentation. The base document for when ROK NGOs were active came from the MOU 
website and lists when the ROK government financially supported HA efforts to North 
Korea through NGOs. Unfortunately, this does not provide the names of specific NGOs, 
so we had to make some assumptions regarding a particular NGO’s activity in certain years. 
In building the dataset for NGO and IO activity within a particular year, we weighted our 
level of certainty concerning whether they were active providing HA to North Korea. In 
particular, we assigned a weight of “3” in the year that a ROK NGO registered with the 
MOU or the year that an NGO or IO established HA efforts in North Korea. If reliable 
open-source documentation supporting HA efforts of an NGO or IO in North Korea in a 
given year was available, we assigned it a weight of “2.” If we believed with some 
certainty, through previous activity or the ROK government’s focus on certain capabilities, 
that the NGO or IO was active that year, we assigned it a weight of “1.” If the ROK 
government did not support HA efforts financially through NGOs, or IOs did not operate 
that year, and we found no open-source information to support an organization's activity, 
then we assigned it a weight of “0” (i.e., it was not active in that year). This network was 
then transformed into a one-mode network where a tie between two NGOs/IOs indicates 
that in the same year they both participated in at least one HA activity (albeit, not 
necessarily the same HA activity). 
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2. NGO Characteristics (Attributes) 
We collected two sets of attribute (characteristic) data on the 108 organizations 
included in our network: capabilities and membership. For the former, we drew on the “UN 
cluster approach” (see below for description) to categorize each organization’s response 
capabilities for providing HA to North Korea. Because the ROK NGOs do not define their 
capabilities in alignment with the UN cluster approach, we developed a process for 
accurately capturing their capabilities. We chose the UN cluster approach since the UN 
and governmental organizations who currently operate and have been primarily engaged 
with North Korea since the late 1990s use this model to manage organizational capabilities 
for an HADR response. It is designed to enhance predictability, accountability, and 
partnership of UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations.183 Some organizations have a 
specific capability, while others are more diverse and have multiple ones. These 
capabilities are contextually associated with humanitarian activities that NGOs and IOs 
execute to build local and host-nation capacity, to minimize suffering, and to mitigate the 
adverse effects caused by natural disasters. The 11 clusters defined below are paramount 
in coordination to lessen the gaps and overlaps of assistance delivered to countries globally 
from humanitarian organizations.184 
a. Camp Coordination and Camp Management 
This involves coordinating actors to prevent duplication of efforts and provide 
minimal humanitarian standards. According to Humanitarian Response, the role of the 
cluster is the following: 
coordinates humanitarian actors with regards to all services provided to 
displaced populations within any communal settings (i.e., camps, informal 
settlements, collective centers); and working with the affected population 
to ensure representation, on-site governance and access to information 
about services provided.185 
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We placed NGOs and IOs that performed capabilities dealing with housing and living 
conditions into this category. It would be plausible for them to work closely within this 
cluster for identifying gaps and coordinating efforts. 
b. Early Recovery 
Humanitarian Response defines the early recovery cluster the following way, “The 
cluster for early recovery leads global and interagency efforts to establish and maintain 
standards and policy, build response capacity and operational support.”186 We placed 
NGOs and IOs that worked primarily in livelihood and longstanding intervention into this 
cluster.  
c. Education  
According to Humanitarian Response,  
The education cluster brings together NGOs, UN agencies, academics, and 
other partners under the shared goal of ensuring predictable, well-
coordinated and equitable provision of education for populations affected 
by humanitarian crises.187  
This cluster deals primarily with capacity building through sharing of information 
and best practices. We placed NGOs and IOs that listed this as their primary capability into 
the education cluster. 
d. Emergency Telecommunications 
According to Humanitarian Response, “Emergency telecommunications cluster is 
a global network of organizations that work together to provide shared communications 
services in humanitarian emergencies.”188 None of the NGOs or IOs in our network fell 
into this cluster. This is a capability best suited for global organizations.  
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e. Food Security 
According to Humanitarian Response, the food security cluster “coordinates the 
food security response during a humanitarian crisis, addressing issues of food availability, 
access, and utilization.”189 We placed NGOs and IOs into the food security cluster if their 
primary capability was providing food to vulnerable populations. 
f. Health 
According to Human Response, the health cluster involves “working to meet the 
health needs” of affected people “to relieve suffering and save lives in humanitarian 
emergencies while advancing the well-being and dignity of affected populations.”190 We 
placed any organization listing their primary capability as health or medical care into the 
health cluster. This is the most likely cluster the organizations would coordinate under to 
ensure proper coverage of the crisis-effected area. 
g. Logistics 
The primary role of the logistics cluster is to “act as a liaison between humanitarian 
actors, where logistics operations are concerned.”191 The logistics cluster works to support 
organizations and staff through logistical support. According to Humanitarian Response, 
The logistics cluster provides coordination and Information Management to 
support operational decision-making and improve the predictability, 
timeliness, and efficiency of the humanitarian emergency response. Where 
necessary, the Logistics Cluster also facilitates access to common logistics 
services.192  
If an organization dealt with the logistical movement of supplies, then we placed them into 
this cluster.  
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h. Nutrition 
According to Humanitarian Response, the nutrition cluster safeguards and 
improves “the nutritional status of crisis-affected populations by enabling coordination 
mechanisms to achieve timely, quality, and appropriate nutrition response to effectively 
and accountably meet the needs of people affected by humanitarian crises.”193 We placed 
organizations into the nutrition cluster if they listed their primary capability as dealing with 
malnutrition or child care. 
i. Protection 
According to Humanitarian Response, the protection cluster does the following: 
coordinates and provides global level inter-agency policy advice and 
guidance on the implementation of the cluster approach to Protection 
Clusters in the field, supports protection responses in non-refugee situation 
humanitarian action as well as leads standard and policy setting relating to 
protection in complex and natural disaster humanitarian emergencies, in 
particular with regard to the protection of internally displaced persons.194 
We placed organizations into the protection cluster if they mentioned dealing with welfare 
of displaced persons. 
j. Shelter 
According to Humanitarian Response,  
The Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) is an Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) coordination mechanism that supports people affected by natural 
disasters and internally displaced people affected by the conflict with the 
means to live in a safe, dignified and appropriate shelter. The GSC enables 
better coordination among all shelter actors, including local and national 
governments, so that people who need shelter assistance get help faster and 
receive the right kind of support.195 
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Some organizations listed their capabilities as assisting in providing heating and temporary 
housing. In this instance, we placed them into the shelter cluster.  
k. Water Sanitation and Hygiene  
The water, sanitation and hygiene cluster ensures coordination of all organizations 
that provide assistance to crisis areas, while also remaining culturally sensitive to those 
effected. According to Humanitarian Response, 
The Global Water Sanitation and Hygiene Cluster, or Global WASH 
Cluster (GWC) is a partnership grouping 32 partners and aiming at 
improving the coordination and the humanitarian response in the WASH 
Sector. It is managed through a governance system designed to facilitate the 
achievement of the 2016–2020 GWC Strategic Plan in a transparent and 
efficient manner.196 
If an organization provided water, sanitation, and hygiene as their primary capability, they 
were categorized together. This means that they would likely coordinate with one another 
to identify the locations and persons needing assistance during a crisis event. 
We categorized each organization’s membership in order to analyze the affiliations 
of organizations within the network and their relationship to one another through time and 
capabilities. The categories are defined as follows: 
1. MOU registered 
2. Affiliation under the KNCCNK umbrella organization 
3. ROK NGO 
4. IO with residence in North Korea 
5. U.S. organization 
6. Non-U.S. international organization.  
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3. Parsing Network Data by Organizational Capabilities 
As noted above, we transformed our two-mode NGO network into a one-mode 
network wherein a tie between two NGOs/IOs indicates that in the same year they both 
participated in at least one HA activity. However, just because two NGOs/IOs were active 
in the same year does not necessarily mean that they actually interacted with one another. 
Thus, we chose to only assume that they did if, in addition to participating in an HA activity 
in the same year, they also engaged in one or more of the same capabilities described 
above.197 Figure 4 presents the complete NGO network. The network displays high 
concentration of ties and actors toward the middle of the network. On the periphery, it 
shows that there are less actors that are clustered into smaller subgroups or solitary actors 
(not isolates). The subgroups are labeled according to their UN cluster capability that they 
provide toward the humanitarian effort. Generally, if the subgroup provided only a single 
capability, then the subgroup tended to be on the periphery. However, once the subgroups 
possessed more than one UN cluster capability and was active in humanitarian operations 
over several years, it became more central to the network. Individual actors scoring high 
in terms of eigenvector centrality (see definition below) are highlighted by the larger blue 
nodes and illustrate those that are key for coordination, collaboration, and facilitation of 
HA activities in the DPRK over the last 23 years.  
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Figure 4. Complete NGO Network 
 
4. Network Metrics 
In the end, we generated network data for 23 years (1995–2018). We analyze the 
complete network, as well as for five particular years (1995, 2000, 2008, 2010, and 2018). 
We chose these years because we believe they best illustrate the changes that occurred in 
the NGO network over time. They were significant to the network and the overall narrative 
of NGO’s varying capabilities in the DPRK because of geopolitical decisions by the ROK, 
DPRK, and the international community. We analyze the networks in terms of their 
topography and the centrality of key NGOs/IOs. We now briefly consider the metrics used 
in our analysis. 
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5. Topography 
We use several measures to explore the topography of the NGO network. Network 
size refers to the number of actors in a network. Network density, which is one of the more 
common metrics, is the proportion of actual to maximum possible number of ties in a 
network.198 Because it can be problematic to use network density to compare networks 
that vary in size, we also use average degree, which is not sensitive to network size and 
equals the average number of ties among all actors in a network.199 Another topographical 
measure, connectedness (also known as cohesion), equals the proportion of connected pairs 
of actors in a network (i.e., ratio of actual over maximum). We also include compactness, 
which is the distance-weighted version of connectedness; more specifically, the proportion 
of connected pairs is weighted by the network’s average distance (see definition of average 
distance below).200 In other words, if there are two networks, A and B, with the same 
number of actors and level of connectedness but the average distance of network A is less 
than that of network B, then we consider A to be more “compact” than B (i.e., it will have 
a higher compactness score). 
We also consider the centralization of the network; centralization captures the 
extent to which a network is centralized around a single actor.201 Centralization measures 
are a function of the type of centrality used to identify a network’s central actors. Here, we 
use degree and betweenness centralization. The former uses the variation in actor degree 
centrality within the network to measure the level of centralization, while the latter uses 
variation in actor betweenness centrality. More variation yields higher network 
centralizations scores; less variation yields lower scores.202 We also consider the 
network’s average distance, which is the average length of all the shortest paths (i.e., 
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geodesics) between all pairs of connected actors in a network.203 Finally, we examine the 
network’s diameter, which equals the length of the longest geodesic in a network.204 Table 
1 presents these metrics for the entire network and by year.  





1995 2000 2008 2010 2018 
Size 108 7 32 75 26 29 
Density 0.422 0.612 0.740 0.717 0.689 0.679 
Average 
Degree 45.111 4.286 23.688 53.040 17.231 12.900 
Connectedness 0.840 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Compactness 0.631 0.857 0.882 0.858 0.845 0.839 
Degree 
Centralization 0.504 0.364 0.247 0.289 0.330 0.291 
Betweenness 
Centralization 0.306 0.180 0.017 0.009 0.041 0.023 
Average 
Distance 1.498 1.286 1.236 1.283 1.311 1.321 
Diameter 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
6. Centrality 
For identifying central nodes within the complete NGO-IO network,205 we use four 
measures of centrality: degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. We have already 
described degree and betweenness above. Closeness centrality captures how close each 
actor is to all other actors in a network. Because our network contained isolates, we used 
the average reciprocal distance (ARD) to calculate closeness. Eigenvector assumes that ties 
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205 By complete, we mean the NGO network before we break it down into particular years. 
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to central actors are more important than ties to peripheral actors and thus weighs each 
actor’s summed connections to other actors by their degree centrality scores.206 Table 2 
presents the top-ranked NGOs and IOs for the complete network.  
Table 2. Top-Ranked NGOs/IOs by Centrality Scores  

















































































Notes: All centrality scores are normalized except degree, which reflects the count of an 
NGO’s ties. 
Actors in bold lettering appear three or more times in the centrality scores. 
For a complete list of NGOs, see appendix.  
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Based on the degree centrality score of the complete NGO network, the key 
organizations that consistently showed up over 23 years are Samaritan’s Purse (SAMP), 
International Commission for the Red Cross (ICRC), Gyung-Nam Unification Agriculture 
Collaboration Council (GYUNGN), IFRC, CHFK, Triangle Gènèration Humanitaire 
(TGHUM), KSM, AFSC, Global Resource Services (GLRS), and Join Together Society 
(JOINTS). These organizations reveal seven international organizations that conduct HA 
globally—four of which are from the United States, with the other three claiming residence 
in the DPRK. The three from the ROK are affiliated with the Korean umbrella group 
KNCCNK. In short, it appears that international organizations generally scored higher than 
ROK-based nongovernmental organizations in terms of centrality. So, unpacking the 
network and providing analysis by specified years is the most logical step to understanding 
the dynamics of the network. 
B. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF THE NGO/IO NETWORK 
1995 was the first annual data point that was collected because this was the most 
notable year in which NGO operations first gained their notoriety but were also very 
limited in their capability and size. Hence, the number of actors in the network involved in 
HA activities totaled only seven: Korean Food for the Hungry (KFHI), IFRC, AFSC, 
CCHFK, Mercy Corps, Agape International, and Médecins Sans Frontières represented in 
Figure 5. In 1995, the network yielded the highest betweenness centralization score for an 
individual year aside from the complete NGO network. This is obvious for two reasons. 
First, the network has very few actors that share similar capabilities and probably assisted 
to the same HADR events in that year. Second, is most of the NGOs are well-established 
international organizations that have provided HA in other countries, so it is likely previous 
relationships were made before humanitarian efforts in 1995. By the end of 1996, the 
international community increasingly placed attention on the humanitarian crisis allowing 
more actors and enhanced capabilities toward the problem set.  
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Figure 5. 1995 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK 
 
a. 2000 
The network grew rapidly from 1995 to 2000, increasing in size from seven actors 
to 32, reflecting the fact that more relief organizations were involved in HA and disaster 
relief (in Table 1). Over the same time period, average distance scored the lowest in the 
entire network, suggesting that in 2000, on average, NGOs could collaborate with each 
other for HA activities and operational support more than in the previous five years. The 
collaboration that occurred was vital to initial success for most actors.  
Some NGOs (especially ROK NGOs) may have sought out other actors in the 
network if their internal capabilities were insufficient for a specific humanitarian disaster. 
Individual actor’s centrality scores were an indicator to whether they may have cooperated 
at a greater rate. As an example, the highest scorers in eigenvector centrality for this year 
were Caritas Corea (CARKOR), Good Neighbor International, SAMP, KFHI, and JOINTS 
(see Figure 6). All of these organizations are ROK NGOs, except for SAMP. This meant 
that many organizations that were not as central to the network, were likely to reach out to 
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these five organizations because they may be leaders in their HA sectors, but also they are 
very well-connected to other lead organizations.  
Figure 6. 2000 Humanitarian Assistance Network Supporting the DPRK 
 
b. 2008 
Changes from 2001 to 2008 showcase the two Korean governments’ eagerness and 
willingness to work to minimize humanitarian suffering, to growing the social capacity of 
institutions in North Korea, and to continuing cross-border exchanges. This is reflected in 
the number of actors in the network. The network doubled in size from 32 to 75 and most 
of these NGOs actively participated as a direct result of the ROK’s single-channel policy, 
which forced all ROK NGOs to go through the MOU if they wanted to receive funding and 
participate in humanitarian activities. Furthermore, the network exhibited the lowest 
betweenness centralization score of all of the five years we analyzed. This highlights that 
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although there is growth in the network, the network became more decentralized. 
Therefore, some NGOs that just entered the humanitarian effort in 2008 may not have 
relationships with other NGOs because the variation in capabilities that have entered the 
network reduced the chances of NGOs working at the same humanitarian event.  
In the earlier years of the network, specifically in 1995, we observed that the 
leading actors in the network were mainly international NGOs, primarily due to the amount 
of access to funding and resources they generally had at their disposal. However, this was 
not the case at the height of President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy, which contributed 
nearly $400 million in aid.207 Actors that were ROK registered NGOs or international 
NGOs based out of South Korea saturated the network and scored the highest in every 
single metric. As an example, in 2008, CARKOR, GONI, Gyungunam Unification 
Agriculture Collaboration Cooperation, Inter-Korea Cooperation and Development 
Council, and Jeju Center for Inter-Korea Exchange & Cooperation had the highest total 
degree and betweenness scores (see Figure 7, blue actors). In this particular year, if an actor 
consistently ranked in the top 10, it is assessed to have steadily provided two or more 
capabilities over eight years. More telling is that it belonged to the larger humanitarian 
coordination group, the KNCCNK, which acts as an advocacy group and liaison to the 
ROK government. This may infer that ROK NGOs were able to compete with international 
organizations if they had a heightened standing within the KNCCNK. 
By contrast, ICRC and SAMP are the only non-ROK NGOs ranked in the top 10 at 
number nine and 10 (see Figure 7, green actors), a stark contrast in actors compared to 
1995 and 2018. The 2008 HA network demonstrated that ROK-based NGOs were certainly 
a vital component to the humanitarian efforts at the time.  
The rapid growth of the network from 2000 to 2008 did not substantially alter the 
network’s compactness (0.882–0.858 out of a score of 1) (as in Table 1). Compactness may 
reflect the level of trust and cooperation among a group’s actors. Typically, when actors 
have trust in an organization or a group, they tend to stay longer, invest resources, and 
develop that group to sustain it. Therefore, the score suggests that the actors involved in 
                                                 
207 Ministry of Unification, “Brief Information.”  
54 
the network maintained relatively good mutual trust in one another over time, despite the 
network's growth. 
To get a more comprehensive idea of centrality, compactness, and actors within the 
network, Figure 7 presents the top 10 scoring actors in terms of eigenvector centrality as 
either blue or green nodes (blue indicates ROK-based NGOs; green indicates IOs) and 
where their size varies in terms of their centrality score. The other NGOs are represented 
in pink but did not score in the top 10. Finally, the 2008 network helps visualize the height 
of NGO participation and activities in the DPRK, as the years that followed showed 
significant degradation in both capabilities and actors.  




Two years later, the network experienced serious attrition due to the cessation of 
six-party talks, the sinking of a South Korean naval ship (the Cheonan), and the Republic 
of Korea reverting to a policy of containment rather than engagement. As a consequence, 
the number of actors in the network dropped from 75 to 26. This directly reflects the 
reduced financial contributions for HA provided to the DPRK by the ROK, United States, 
and other international actors. The ROK-based NGOs were significantly affected by the 
geopolitical issues that influenced humanitarian operations and the funding the ROK 
provided. In 2010, the resource-deprived environment forced many NGOs to leave the 
network, or focus on specific capabilities such as nutrition, health, and food security that 
both the DPRK and ROK emphasized.  
The shrinking of the network helps explain why it became more centralized (.330) 
than any other single year (Table 1). The organizations that managed to maintain a central 
position in the network were funded by United Nations subsidiary organizations such as 
WFP, World Health Organization, or fell under the European Union Program, which 
provided additional resources. Moreover, the ROK-based organizations that remained in 
the network did so because the ROK government allowed them to operate as an extension 
of its policy. Once again, the three ROK-based NGOs central to the network are members 
of the KNCCNK. Their affiliation extends their breadth and reaches to other relevant actors 
that conducted operations in 2010. Over the next eight years that followed, the network did 
not regenerate with nearly the same number of actors it did when aid funding and inter-
Korean policy created the conditions for a robust HA network to thrive (see Figure 8). 
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The network in 2018 consisted of only 20 actors, and all but World Vision Korea 
(dark green actor) was a non-ROK NGO (see Figure 9). It is important to note again that 
research collection ended in early 2018; therefore, it is possible more organizations entered 
the network. That noted, much of the observed attrition was due to President Park Guen-
hye’s policies, which limited aid contribution to North Korea and often used third party 
entities, such as China, to avoid direct interaction. Also, much of the HA provided by the 
ROK came with stipulations to ensure it would go to North Korea’s most vulnerable 
populations, rather than being used internally for North Korean regime members. Hence, 
the HA the DPRK requested after 2010 was particularly geared toward capacity building 
in nutrition and health sectors along with education, which many international 
organizations were able to provide.  
The NGOs that ranked within the top five in degree centrality in 2018 were SAMP, 
IFRC, ICRC, TGHUM, and AFSC. This is a strong indicator that all five organizations 
shared certain capabilities in the capacity building fields, but also were active in disaster 
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relief, attended the same charitable events, and belong to other umbrella groups. Another 
measure such as average distance can also showcase how actors communicate or exchange 
information and ideas. In this instance, the average distance for the overall network (scored 
a 1.321) meant that if TGHUM needed help regarding a specific task for water sanitation 
and hygiene -based capability, reaching out to SAMP would be slightly more difficult to 
do in 2018 than it would have been in 2000 (scoring a 1.236). Consequently, the actors that 
needed to reach out for supplemental capabilities could generally look to the top five, if 
not the top three actors to meet help mitigate the humanitarian crisis.  
The network displayed a noticeable topographical aspect in 2018 (see Figure 9): a 
cluster appeared, and a subgroup with three actors was defined outside of the primary 
cluster of actors. The organizations Chosun Exchange, Mennonite Central Committee, and 
Handicap International (blue in Figure 9) all formed a subgroup that had brokerage ties to 
IFCR, SAMP, and ICRC (red in Figure 9). This is a significant subgroup because despite 
the network being highly centralized, a subgroup emerged that has one capability (capacity 
building in the health sector), it could offer to the HA effort in 2018. Thus, if governmental 
entities or other international organizations are interested in subject matter exchanges or 
outreach programs, SAMP, IFRC, and ICRC are the best organizations to contact for a 
broad array of capabilities.  
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Figure 9. 2018 Humanitarian Assistance Network Support to the DPRK 
 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the HA network over 23 years and from a temporal aspect helped 
determine which actors that are central to the network, elements of their centrality, and the 
metrics that supported what their position in network meant to HA efforts in the DPRK. 
There are two important conclusions we draw from our analysis of the network. The first 
is that it revealed that every top-ranked ROK NGO also belonged to the KNCCNK. This 
potentially meant that for a South Korean NGO to gain prestige and relevancy, the 
KNCCNK was effective at advocating on NGOs’ behalf to the ROK government. Second, 
inter-Korean relations are a critical component in determining the type of capabilities both 
international organizations and ROK-based NGOs should deliver to meet the needs of the 
DPRK. More specifically, international organizations, such as SAMP, IFRC, ICRC, 
TGHUM, and AFSC, should continue to position themselves within the network to serve 
equally as deliverers of HA and key interlocutors in the future.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The focus if this chapter is conclusions and recommendations from our research. 
Our conclusions reflect the historical context for HADR activities on the peninsula and the 
changes that have occurred to HADR capacity as relates to potential future operations. Our 
recommendations emphasize how resource integration between the ROK and NGOs could 
support crisis response; they also stress the importance of collaboration to address civil 
vulnerabilities. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the Korean War’s armistice, differences in economic prosperity and the level 
of civil liberty between the DPRK and the ROK have greatly affected each country’s crisis 
resiliency and crisis management capacity. It was a crisis in the form of a natural disaster 
and the resulting humanitarian emergency that established the aid donor-recipient 
relationship between the two countries in the 1990s.208 Since that time, IOs and NGOs 
have had varying levels of success conducting a range of humanitarian operations in the 
DPRK. Although the recent warming of U.S.-ROK-DPRK relations may include additional 
humanitarian exchanges, a major crisis or regime collapse still appears likely.209 For 
example, a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies revealed the 
undisclosed location of and ballistic missile activity near the demilitarized zone, one of an 
estimated 20 undisclosed locations where North Korea continues to pursue its ballistic 
missiles and weapons programs.210 This activity is in stark contrast to other public gestures 
made by the regime in an effort to gain sanctions relief from the United States without 
actually making tangible security concessions.211 Recently, tensions have again risen 
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because denuclearization talks have stalled, and North Korea is increasingly frustrated with 
the United States for maintaining its tough stance on sanctions.212 
HA remains a political tool for both North and South Korea. It was more than for 
pure humanitarian reasons that led to the expansion of NGO numbers and capabilities in 
South Korea since the 1980s. Even when aid from NGOs is misused by the DPRK, it 
continues to be an important means to respond to crisis and increase interaction with North 
Korea in reunification efforts through the MOU.213 As such, the international community 
considers NGOs a valuable resource for a range of operations, from steady state to stability. 
NGO operations in the DPRK have varied over time, and the type of operations 
have ranged from crisis response with emergency aid to capacity building through 
educational outreach. Both are multinational efforts and aimed at preventing large-scale 
disasters. According to our research, because of geopolitical constraints limiting IO and 
NGO funding and operations since 2010, international funding has primarily focused on 
vulnerable populations and nutrition.  
It is important to understand changes in NGO operations over time because many 
factors affect which NGOs conduct humanitarian operations. Our research suggests that 
there are a few IOs and NGOs that maintain consistent operations in North Korea despite 
regional political changes and/or funding modifications, and they share several similar 
characteristics. One such similarity is that organizations that maintain a reliably central role 
in HADR are adaptable. They offer a variety of capabilities that they can leverage to gain 
access to North Korea and address multiple sectors of humanitarian activities. A second, 
regular operations, which are key to the long term, are independently fostered 
organizational relationships with North Korean entities and the ROK government that 
weather shocks to the political system on both sides of the border.  
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Through its “whole of government” approach, the South Korean government is 
actively increasing its internal capability to conduct HADR through training, education, 
and logistical resources for both domestic and foreign disaster response.214 NGOs are an 
integral component of the ROK crisis response plan through the MOU.215 Our 
recommendations are based on how the international community would integrate with the 
ROK and its resources to respond to a crisis. They also consider how the international 
community, primarily the United States and the ROK, should prepare to address civil 
vulnerabilities in a crisis.216 It is to those recommendations that we now turn. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. FORCES IN HADR ON THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA 
The ROK retains a holistic capability during a crisis on the peninsula that is 
recognized by the international community. When needed, support to South Korea during 
crises includes the synchronization of plans and available resources. Our analysis has 
illustrated some of the ways by which the UNC and the ROK could more fully integrate 
efforts to ensure a coordinated disaster response that would include all relevant agencies 
and organizations. For U.S. Army Civil Affairs, steady state operations present an 
opportunity for greater integration with the ROK, which, in turn, would ensure unity of 
effort to maximize available resources. 
First, the ROK and UNC must synchronize their concepts of stability operations 
and stability operations planning for a collapsed North Korean regime. This would 
maximize the coordination of civil population focused organizations such as U.S. Civil 
Affairs, IOs, and NGOs. Currently, the UNC and the ROK perceive stabilization efforts 
differently. Because of its constitutional claim over the entire peninsula, the ROK sees 
stability operations as a unilateral endeavor. The UNC does not fully support this when it 
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comes to the autonomous administration of the liberated regions.217 This is captured in our 
SNA of the 2008 HA network. The ROK-based NGOs saturated the network because of 
their capacity as extensions of the MOU support for the single channel policy in an attempt 
to maintain primacy over HADR in the DPRK. Therefore, it complicates the employment 
of both civil affairs forces and the control of humanitarian operations across the peninsula.  
Second, clarification of the methodology for employing and directing CAO is 
critical, especially in terms of a complete regime collapse scenario. Civil affairs should be 
fully integrated into the civil military operations centers, allied civil-military cooperation 
entities, and with U.S. interagency elements throughout the theater to support and sustain 
stability operations in the ROK.  
Currently, civil affairs forces are assigned to different types of commands in Korea 
as part of steady-state operations. Some have minimal freedom of action and engagement. 
Although this was done to prevent miscommunication and “engagement-fratricide” 
between U.S. organizations and ROK organizations, it limits civil affair’s ability to develop 
humanitarian networks and gain situational awareness, such as firsthand knowledge of the 
capabilities of South Korean NGOs and their experience working in the DPRK. 
Since precise crisis plans for both the United States and the ROK are classified, but 
we were still able to derive from our open-source research what we believe to be the most 
beneficial use of civil affairs forces in a crisis. In a total war scenario in which the ROK 
requests assistance from the United States, possible employment of civil affairs would be 
to pair civil affairs forces with USG agencies. Civil affairs could provide continual 
assessments of the population’s needs and grievances as well as act as an interlocutor 
between the ROK ministries, USG counterparts, and NGOs identified to provide HA.  
Third, increased focus on interagency capacity building of NGOs and relevant ROK 
organizations will improve coordinated crisis response efforts by the UNC and the ROK. 
It is essential that capacity-building remain an integral part of steady-state operations on 
the Korean Peninsula because increasing organizational capability cannot be undertaken 
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during a crisis response. Foreign internal defense is a civil affairs supported activity which 
strengthens the capability of the ROK military to conduct civil-military operations in 
conjunction with the ROK government which is responsible for the CAO.218  
Given that the ROK military does not do CAO, expert exchanges should also 
include relevant HADR organizations. Civil affairs and organizations with significant 
HADR experience (e.g., USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and IOM) can 
partner with relevant ROK entities to educate, train, and collaborate on disaster response 
for multiple scenarios. For example, the HA network of 2018 highlighted resilient 
international organizations, such as SAMP, IFRC, ICRC, TGHUM, and AFSC, which 
maintained operations during periods of political volatility. These were some of the key 
actors to the HA effort in the DPRK and should be seriously considered for future 
collaboration. Other relevant organizations include ROK ministries such as the Ministries 
of National Defense, Unification, and Interior and Safety. 
Fourth, civil reconnaissance and multi-agency access to civil information of the 
DPRK needs to be improved. Since it is impossible to enter the DPRK to conduct civil 
reconnaissance, it is imperative to expand through digital civil reconnaissance (DCR). We 
can use satellite technology and open source reporting and information about the political, 
military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure to better understand the 
complexity of civil-military operations and HADR in different geographic regions. 
Recently, the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command in Daegu South Korea began 
using DCR for civil reconnaissance in North Korea (named Project W for Wonsan, North 
Korea). With DCR, it is possible to identify areas of civil vulnerability, resources that could 
be leveraged in a crisis event, and basic information about supplies, food production, and 
transportation.219 In addition, it can help collect data that could further distinguish highly 
capable actors in a network, their operational capacity, and how well connected they are to 
other relevant actors in a HA network for future analysis.  
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To maximize the value of these types of assessments for cross-organizational 
planning, they must be accessible by all relevant organizations. A consensus should be 
arrived at for a single platform that possesses an unclassified structure in order to maximize 
access. For example, a tactical assault kit is a portable device that allows users to conduct 
collaborative planning from remote locations, communicate, and maintain real-time 
situational awareness of the common operating environment.220 Digital data repositories 
that support various types of reporting and types of digital information platforms such as 
the protected information exchange encourage the interchange of ideas and information 
across various types of organizations. A well-resourced platform would enhance both 
governments and nongovernmental entities comprehensive understanding of HADR to 
apply assets toward the problem set adequately. 
Finally, the use of SNA helped showcase the importance of non-governmental 
organizations as vital actors with the ability to mitigate the suffering used by persistent 
humanitarian crises in the DPRK. In the future, nongovernmental organizations and 
international organizations can play an even greater role on the Korean Peninsula if the 
United States, ROK, DPRK, and other regional actors provide better opportunities for 
synchronization, resourcing, and exchanges to occur. 
There were several limitations to the research that could serve as pivot points for 
future research on this topic. Research of NGOs in Hangul could expand the amount of 
information and the ability to utilize primary sources. Research utilizing classified 
documentation may illuminate some of the specific operations by NGOs that are obscured 
in open-source documentation. In addition, gaining a comprehensive understanding of how 
the MOU plans to employ NGOs if the conflict escalated toward provocations and 
hostilities would greatly benefit the United States planning process. This would enhance 
the USG’s ability to support the ROK during HADR. With more insight into MOU plans, 
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the USG could assess the ROK’s priorities for HADR in the DPRK, address their 
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APPENDIX.  ACRONYM LIST OF NGOS AND IOS  
ROK NGOs Included in the IOM Document and KNCCNK  
Umbrella Organizations (86 Total) 
CARKOR Caritas Corea 
CHAKOR Catholic Health Association of Korea 
CLCC Climate Change Center 
COSM Coal Sharing Movement 
CRKPEOP Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People 
DGPR Dairy Goat Project 
EUGBEL Eugene Bell Foundation 
EV1K Evergreen One Korea 
F4P Forest for Peace 
FUFO Future Forest 
GOOF Good Farmers 
GOODHAN Good Hands 
GOODHEL Good Helpers 
GONI Good Neighbors International  
GNM Good News Mission 
GOPI Good People International  
GRD Green Doctors 
GRONK Green One Korea 
GTKO Green Tree Korea (Charity Foundation) 
GUCFK Green Umbrella Child Fund Korea 
GCSNKEC Gwangju city South-North Korea Exchange Cooperation Council 
GYUNGN Gyung-Nam Unification Agricultural Collaboration Cooperation 
HFRC Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture 
IKECCF1 Inter-Korean Economic and Cultural Cooperation Foundation 
IKECCF2 Inter-Korea Cooperation and Development Council 
INKAS Inter-Korean Kangwon Association 
INAID-K International Aid Korea 
INFF International Corn Foundation 
68 
INLF International Love Foundation 
JEJUCINK Jeju Center for Inter-Korea Exchange & Cooperation 
JEORINAS Jeollanamdo Resident Interchange Association  
JOINTS Join Together Society 
KIMDJPC Kim Dae Jung Peace Center 
KFHI Korea Food for the Hungry 
KOAHP Korea Association of Health Promotion 
KOMEA Korea Medical Engineering Association 
KOPF Korea Peace Foundation 
KOPAF Korea Peninsula Agro-fishery 
KUNET Korea Unification Network 
KFWOA Korean Foundation for World Aid 
KOAUD Korean Academy of Unification for Dentistry 
KLTMO Korean Living Together Movement 
KOMAS Korean Medical Association 
KOUNESCO Korean National Commission for UNESCO 
KNTUBA Korean National Tuberculosis Association 
KSM Korean Sharing Movement 
LIGHTF Lighthouse Foundation 
LCIKSA Lions Club International, Korea State Council 
LOK Love One Korea Foundation 
MAID-C Medical Aid for Children 
MO41K Movement for One Korea 
NANU-I Nanum International  
NRCO Nation Reconciliation Committee 
NCSAEUM National Council of Saemaul Undong Movement 
KYMCA National Council for YMCAs of Korea 
NWNP New World Nice People 
NEW2000 New Millennium Life Movement 
NOBIS-PA Nobis Pacem Foundation 
NEAFOR Northeast Asian Forest Forum 
OKEDFEC Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture 
OCIK Okedongmu Children in Korea 
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OGKM One Green Korea Movement 
1KBM One Korea Buddhist Movement 
PRIINKEEX Private Inter-Korean Economic Exchange Council 
PAPERC Paper Culture Foundation  
RELFU Religion Forum for Unification 
SAMCINT SAM Care International 
SARANG Sarang Baskets 
SPKF Service for Peace Korea Foundation  
SHTW Share the World 
SHATOS Sharing Together Society 
S-NCIV South-North Civil Exchange Council 
S-NORAL South-North Oral Healthcare Council 
S-NSHA South-North Sharing Campaign 
CP3000 The Corea Peace 3000 
FOINTK The Foundation for Inter-Korea Medical Cooperation 
GAPRES The General Assembly of Presbyterian Church of Korea 
KAPSL The Korean Association of People Sharing Love 
KOMC The Korean Methodist Church 
SAKT The Salvation Army Korea Territory  
TOPIK Towards Peace in Korea 
UWCK UWC Korea Nauen Foundation 
WITH-A With Asia 
WON-BM Won-Buddhist Movement for Sowing  
WOR-V World Vision  





International Organizations with Residence in DPRK (9 Total) 
PRUINT Première Urgence International 
STC Save the Children 
CONWOR Concern Worldwide 
DEU-W Deutsche Welthungerhilfe 
TGHUM Triangle Génération Humanitaire 
HAND-IN Handicap International  
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Corporation 
 
Non-resident Organizations Assisting in HADR for DPRK (13 Total) 
AFSC American Friends Service Committee 
AGAPE Agape International 
CHEX Chosun Exchange 
CHFK Christian Friends of Korea 
FiBL FiBL Reseach Institute of Organic Agriculture 
GAiN Global Aid Network  
GLRS Global Resource Services 
iFOAM International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières 
MCC Mennonite Central Committee 
MERCO Mercy Corps 
OXFAM Oxfam Hong Kong 
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